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CONTROLLING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:
A TALE OF TWO INDUSTRIES
Ahmed E. Taha
Large corporate conglomerates are being formed in many
industries. Although a conglomerate may be able to use its multiple
businesses to offer better products or services or lower prices,
conglomeration can also create conflicts of interest within a corporation,
harming consumers. Other researchers and observers have long been
aware of these conflicts of interest, however, this Article’s empirical
analyses identify what specific characteristics of a conglomerate cause
conflicts of interest to actually result in harm to consumers. In doing so,
the Article also guides policymakers regarding how to regulate conflicts of
interest.
This Article examines two industries – financial services and the
media – in which conglomeration has created similar conflicts of interest.
Much attention is being focused on the conflicts of interest of many
research analysts who recommend stocks for investors. These research
analysts work for financial conglomerates that also have investment
banking departments. As a result, these analysts have faced great
pressure to write positive research reports about companies from which
their employers seek investment banking business. Unfortunately, this
pressure has resulted in analysts giving biased recommendations in favor
of these companies, harming millions of investors who rely on these
recommendations. In response to this bias, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, other regulatory organizations, and courts have recently
imposed billions of dollars in fines and civil settlements and a number of
rules and regulations on research analysts and their employers. These
reforms are targeted at reducing and publicly disclosing analysts’ conflict
of interests.
The situation of another group of professionals – movie critics
who work for media conglomerates – is parallel to that of these research
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analysts. Many prominent movie critics, including Roger Ebert, now
regularly review movies that are distributed by studios owned by the
critics’ parent companies. These critics can generate additional profits
for these studios by giving positive reviews to their movies. However,
despite this conflict of interest, this Article’s empirical analyses find no
systematic bias in these critics’ movie reviews.
The difference in the behavior of research analysts and movie
critics raises an important question: Why do some conglomerates’
conflicts of interest result in biased opinions, harming consumers, while
other conflicts of interest do not do so? The Article finds that differences
in the structure of the conglomerates in which research analysts and
movie critics work and differences in the direct financial incentives they
face are responsible for the different outcomes. This conclusion provides
insight into what causes conflicts of interest in conglomerates to result in
harm to consumers and how policymakers should regulate conflicts of
interest.
INTRODUCTION
Increasing conglomeration is occurring in many industries.
Conglomerates can have synergies or operating efficiencies which allow
the production of better goods or services or lower prices.1 However,
conglomeration can also create conflicts of interest within a corporation,
resulting in harm to consumers.
For example, the public spotlight has recently focused on the
conflicts of interest faced by research analysts who work for financial
institutions that also have investment banking departments. Many
investors rely on research analysts for investment advice.2 Many of these
research analysts work for brokerage firms and write research reports
regarding various companies for the brokerages’ clients and other
investors.3 A research report contains facts and opinions about the
1

Thomas Ruffner, The Failed GE/Honeywell Merger: The Return of PortfolioEffects Theory?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1285, 1331 (2003).

2

Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1079 (2003) (“Investors rely on
analyst research, in part, because they believe that analysts have both superior
information and an incentive to convey that information to the marketplace
accurately.”).
3

These research analysts are called “sell side analysts.” There are also “buy side
analysts,” who are employed by institutions that invest money, such as mutual funds
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company that is the subject of the report, and is typically accompanied by
a recommendation regarding whether the company’s stock is a good
investment.4
Although investors expect to receive unbiased stock
recommendations from research analysts, these analysts often face great
pressure to give positive recommendations of companies’ stocks to help
their firms secure investment banking business from those companies.5 As
a result, research analysts gave biased investment advice, causing “untold
millions of individual investors [to lose] vast sums of money.”6 In
response to this bias, the Securities and Exchange Commission, other
regulatory organizations, and consent decrees approved by courts have
recently imposed billions of dollars in fines and civil settlements and also
a number of rules and regulations on research analysts and their
employers. These reforms are targeted at reducing and publicly disclosing
analysts’ conflict of interests.
Media conglomeration can cause similar problems. For example,
there is fear that news outlets that are part of conglomerates will be
reluctant to report unflattering news – or overeager to report positive news
– regarding their corporate parent.7 In addition, for publicity, the products
of one of a conglomerate’s subsidiaries may be unduly featured in the
conglomerate’s media outlets.8 This Article examines another area in
which media conglomeration creates significant conflicts of interest: a
number of media conglomerates own both movie studios and media outlets
and pension funds. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Analyzing Analyst
Recommendations, available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm (June
20, 2002). Sell-side analysts have the conflicts of interest that are the focus of this
Article.
4

Fisch & Sale, supra note 2, at 1040-41.

5
David Schepp, Wall Street Analysts Under Fire, BBC News, June 14, 2001,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1387192.stm.
6

Testimony of NY State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer before U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism at 9 (June 26,
2002), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/062602spitzer.pdf.

7

Dmitri Williams, Synergy Bias: Conglomerates and Promotion in the News, 46 J.
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 453, 453 (2002).

8

Allison Fass, Two Cable Networks Cooperate in a Bid to Cut Through Clutter, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at C5, available at LEXIS, News Library; Steve Johnson, A
Tangled Web, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 7, 2002, at C1, available at LEXIS, News
Library; Reporters Rap Commercial Plugs in Broadcast News, O’DWYER’S PR
SERVICES REPORT, January 1997, at 14, available at LEXIS, News Library.
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that review movies.9 As a result, many prominent movie critics now
regularly review movies distributed by subsidiaries of the critics’ parent
companies.
For example, The Walt Disney Company owns Walt Disney
Pictures and other movie studios and also owns Buena Vista Television,
the distributor of the popular Ebert & Roeper and the Movies television
program, which reviews movies each week.10 Also, the world’s largest
media company, Time Warner Inc., owns movie studios such as Warner
Brothers Pictures and magazines that review movies, including
Entertainment Weekly, Time, and People.11 In addition, Rupert Murdoch’s
The News Corporation Limited owns movie studios, including 20th
Century Fox and owns media outlets, such as the New York Post that
regularly review movies.12
Similar to users of research analysts’ stock recommendations,
consumers use critics’ movie reviews to decide which movies to see.13
Thus the potential for bias in movie reviews is strong. For example, the
movie critics and editors of Entertainment Weekly understand that Time
Warner – Entertainment Weekly’s parent company – financially benefits
from a favorable review by Entertainment Weekly of a Warner Brothers
film.
This article empirically examines whether these conflicts of
interest result in biased movie reviews. It finds that these movie critics’
reviews are generally unbiased despite these conflicts of interest. Thus,
critics working for some of the largest corporations in the country are able
to maintain their objectivity even when doing so hurts their parent

9

The Columbia Journalism Review maintains a list of the businesses owned by major
media companies. Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What, available at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/index.asp.

10

Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What: The Walt Disney Company,
available at http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/disney.asp.

11

Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What:
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/timewarner.asp.

Time Warner, available at

12

Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What: News Corporation, available at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/newscorp.asp.

13

People also use reviews of a movie for help in understanding the movie, to
reinforce their own opinion of the film, and to be able to discuss the movie with other
people more intelligently. Bruce Austin, A Longitudinal Test of the Taste Culture and
Elitist Hypotheses, 11 J. POPULAR FILM & TELEVISION 157, 158 (1983).
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companies financially. This finding stands in stark contrast to the
systematic bias exhibited by research analysts who issue reports on
companies from which their employers seek investment banking business.
This finding also raises an important question: Why do some
conflicts of interest (like those facing research analysts in large financial
conglomerates) result in biased opinions and harm to consumers, while
others (like those facing movie critics in large media conglomerates) do
not? The Article finds that differences in the structure of the organizations
in which movie critics and research analysts work, and differences in the
direct financial incentives facing movie critics and research analysts are
responsible for the different outcomes.
This conclusion has important implications for policymakers seeking
to control conflicts of interest. For example, because many of the recent
reforms directed at research analysts should create an organizational
structure and financial incentives more like those experienced by movie
critics, this Article provides empirical support for inferring that some of
these reforms will significantly reduce research analysts’ bias. This
analysis also suggests that other of the reforms, such as those mandating
disclosure of analysts’ conflicts of interest, are unnecessary. Movie critics
do not disclose their conflicts of interest, yet they do not produce biased
reviews. The Article’s findings indicate that policymakers interested in
controlling particular conflicts of interest should focus on eliminating or
reducing the conflicts of interest rather than on requiring public disclosure
of the conflicts. Indeed, recent research finds that requiring disclosure of
conflicts of interest can actually be harmful to those who receive the
disclosure.
Section I of this Article describes the organizational and incentive
structure in which movie critics operate and the resulting conflicts of
interest they face. Section II discusses the organizational and incentive
structure in which research analysts have operated, the resulting conflicts
of interest and the bias caused by these conflicts, and how recent reforms
attempt to address these conflicts. The empirical assessment of whether
movie critics’ conflicts of interest result in biased movie review decisions
is set out in Section III. Section IV discusses the lessons regarding
controlling conflicts of interest that can be learned from the behavior of
movie critics and research analysts. Section V summarizes and concludes
the Article.
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I. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FACING MOVIE CRITICS
Conglomeration and consolidation in the media has created
enormous media giants that are among the world’s largest corporations.
For example, Time Warner Inc. is the world’s largest media and
entertainment company, and ranks #32 in the Fortune 500, with revenue of
over $42 billion in 2004.14 Among its most-well known operations is the
internet service provider America Online, Time Warner Cable, the CNN
cable channel, popular magazines such as Time, People, Entertainment
Weekly, and the production and distribution of films through businesses
including Warner Brothers Pictures.15
Similarly, The Walt Disney Company, the second largest media
and entertainment conglomerate, had more than $30 billion in revenue in
fiscal year 2004, and ranks #54 in the Fortune 500.16 Among its most well
known media operations are the ABC television network, the ESPN cable
channel, and the production and distribution of movies through studios
including Walt Disney Pictures, Touchtone Pictures, and Miramax
Films.17
The News Corporation Limited is an international media
conglomerate headed by Rupert Murdoch with more than $20 billion in
revenue in fiscal year 2004, ranking #98 in the Fortune 500.18 Among it
businesses is the Fox Broadcasting network (including Fox News), a large
number of newspapers and the production and distribution of movies
through its 20th Century Fox and Fox Searchlight Pictures subsidiaries.19
The large size and scope of such conglomerates has raised many
concerns. For example, many fear that news outlets owned by a
14

Time Warner’s fiscal year ends in December.
Hoovers Online, at
http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?COID=102518.
15
Who Owns What:
Time Warner, COLUM.
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/timewarner.asp.
16

JOURNALISM

Disney’s fiscal year ends in September.
Hoovers
http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?ID=11603

REV.,

at

Online,

at

17

Who Owns What: The Walt Disney Company, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/disney.asp.
18

News Corporation’s fiscal year ends in June.
Hoovers Online, at
http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?COID=41816.
19

Who Owns What:
News Corporation, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/newscorp.asp.
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conglomerate will not fully cover stories that generate negative publicity
for their corporate parent, and will give too much coverage to stories that
give positive publicity to it.20 For example, ABC News may be reluctant
to report on the newsworthy problems at The Walt Disney Company
because Disney owns ABC. Such reluctance would decrease the quality of
the news that viewers receive.
Indeed, other behavior of these conglomerates indicates that these
companies use their multiple divisions in interconnected ways to
maximize their profits. For instance, they use their media outlets to
promote the products and services produced by other companies within the
conglomerate.21 For example, ABC’s Good Morning America television
show covered Disney World’s twenty-fifth anniversary for two hours,
which included an interview of Disney CEO Michael Eisner.22
Many media conglomerates have another way to increase their
profits. These conglomerates own both movie studios and major media
outlets that review movies. For example, The Walt Disney Company
owns Walt Disney Pictures and other movie studios and also owns Buena
Vista Television, the distributor of the popular Ebert & Roeper and the
Movies television program, which each week features movie critics Roger
Ebert and Richard Roeper reviewing movies.23 Ebert & Roeper appears
on more than 200 television stations and is the “top-rated first-run weekly
syndicated half-hour on television.”24
The world’s largest media company, Time Warner Inc., owns
movie studios such as Warner Brothers Pictures and magazines that review
movies, including Entertainment Weekly, Time, and People.25 In addition,
Rupert Murdoch’s The News Corporation Limited produces and
distributes movies through its 20th Century Fox and Fox Searchlight
20

Dmitri Williams, Synergy bias: conglomerates and promotion in the news, 46 J.
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 453, 453 (2002).

21

Fass, supra note 8, at C5; Johnson, supra note 8, at C1; O’Dwyer’s, supra note 8, at
14.

22

Dmitri Williams, Synergy bias: conglomerates and promotion in the news, 46 J.
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 453, 457 (2002).

23

Id.

24

Movies.com, Ebert & Roeper, at http://tvplex.go.com/buenavista/ebertandroeper/
bios/ebert.html.

25

Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What:
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/timewarner.asp.

Time Warner, available at
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Pictures subsidiaries26 and owns media outlets, such as the New York Post
newspaper, that regularly review movies.27
Because consumers use critics’ movie reviews to decide which
movies to see,28 if the conglomerate’s media outlets give positive reviews
of movies distributed by the conglomerate’s movie studios, then the
studios’ profits will increase. Thus, these movie critics face a conflict of
interest creating the potential for bias in their movie reviews: although
readers of their reviews expect the critics’ sincere opinions about the
movies, these critics can financially benefit their affiliated studios by
giving positive reviews to movies distributed by those studios (“affiliated
movies”).
There is much evidence that studios greatly value positive reviews.
Most studies have found that favorable movie reviews result in more
people seeing a movie than do unfavorable reviews.29 Even positive
reviews from individual critics can have a significant effect on a movie’s
success. For example, having a movie receive a “thumbs up” from Roger
Ebert and Richard Roeper is “worth millions to the studios.”30
Critics’ reviews can significantly impact the success of even the
most heavily advertised films, especially if critics state that a particular
such movie goes beyond typical expectations for movies of that genre.31
26

Who Owns What:
News Corporation, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/newscorp.asp.
27

Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What: News Corporation, available at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/newscorp.asp.
28

People also use reviews of a movie for help in understanding the movie, to
reinforce their own opinion of the film, and to be able to discuss the movie with other
people more intelligently. Bruce Austin, A Longitudinal Test of the Taste Culture and
Elitist Hypotheses, 11 J. POPULAR FILM & TELEVISION 157, 158 (1983).

29

See Suman Basuroy, Subimal Chatterjee, S. Abraham Ravid, How Critical are
Critical Reviews? The Box Office Effects of Film Critics, Star-Power, and Budgets,
67 J. MARKETING 103 (2003) and the studies cited therein at 107; David A. Reinstein
& Christopher M. Snyder, The Influence of Expert Reviews on Consumer Demand for
Experience Goods: A Case Study of Movie Critics, J. INDUS. ECON. (forthcoming),
Cf. S. Abraham Ravid, Information, Blockbusters, and Stars: A Study of the Film
Industry, 72 J. BUS. 463 (1999) (finding that positive reviews do not significantly
affect the revenue earned by a movie).
30

Lorenza Munoz, Credibility on the High Seas, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at F10,
available at 2002 WL 2458178.
31

David Shaw, Thumbs Up or Down on Movie Critics?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1999,
at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library.
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For example, movies including Men in Black, Saving Private Ryan,
Scream, and The Terminator, were transformed from being “hits” to being
“mega-hits” by critics informing moviegoers that these hit movies were
also actually good movies.32
Also, the behavior of movie studios clearly demonstrates that
studios believe that positive reviews are important. Advertising for
movies routinely contains favorable quotes from critics. Positive
statements from well-known critics, such as Roger Ebert, are featured
especially prominently in advertising.33 Studios also sometimes eliminate
or delay advance screenings of a movie for critics if the studios believe
that the movie will receive bad reviews.34
In addition, studios have misused movie reviews in advertising
movies. In 2001, two Sony advertising executives were suspended for
thirty days when it was discovered that Sony had created quotes from a
fictitious movie critic to use in advertisements for four movies of
“questionable-quality,” The Animal, Hollow Man, A Knight’s Tale, and
Vertical Limit.35 Many in the movie industry feared that this transgression

32

Id.

33

See e.g., Dade Hayes, Two Thumbs Way Up!,VARIETY, Jan. 5, 2004, at 11,
available at LEXIS, News Library (noting that Newmarket, the distributor of the
movie Monster, which starred actress Charlize Theron, “plastered Roger Ebert’s rave
– ‘[Charlize Theron gives o]ne of the best performances in the history of cinema’ –
all over print ads”); Richard Natale, When His Thumb Turned, Millions Got the
Message; Responding to Movies Like a Couple of Guys at the Water Cooler, Siskel
and Ebert Gained Power in Hollywood Marketing Circles, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24,
1999, at F1, available at LEXIS, News Library (in talking about the Siskel and Ebert
television show – the predecessor of Ebert & Roeper – the head of distribution of
Sony Pictures states that “[i]t was always a major plus to get their approval, . . . . I
can’t think of a case where we got two thumbs up that we didn’t use it in TV ad
spots”).
34

See, e.g., James Sanford, James Sanford Chooses the Best and Worst Films of
2002, at http://www.interbridge.com/jamessanford/bestof2002.html (Warner Brothers
canceled advanced critical screenings of The Adventures of Pluto Nash due to
concerns that the movie would receive poor reviews).
35

Robert W. Welkos, Untruths and Consequences, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at 5,
available at 2001 WL 2498017; Hays, supra note 33; Emanuella Grinberg,
Moviegoers to settle with studio after being lured by phony critic (Mar. 9, 2004), at
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/LAW/03/09/phony.critic/.
Studios
have
also
misrepresented testimonials from other sources. Four major studios have admitted to
using employees or actors posing as ordinary moviegoers to provide testimonials in
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would result in governmental regulation.36 However, the Federal Trade
Commission did not take any action against Sony, citing higher priorities
for the agency and the disciplining effect of the bad publicity that Sony
received from the incident.37
However, Sony did not completely escape direct punishment for its
transgression. Sony settled for $1.5 million a class action suit filed on
behalf of persons who allegedly were persuaded by the phony reviews to
see the movies.38 Also, it paid a $326,000 fine to the state of Connecticut
for claiming that the fictitious critic worked for a local Connecticut
newspaper.39 In addition, it paid $25,000 to the consumer protection and
education fund of the Oregon Department of Justice to settle deceptive
advertising charges.40
More evidence of the importance of positive reviews is that studios
sometimes misuse excerpts from even legitimate reviews. For example,
the advertisements for the movie Hoodlum, starring actor Laurence
Fishburne, quoted Los Angeles Times movie critic David Turan as having
called the movie “[I]rresistible,” when actually he had written that “[e]ven
[Laurence Fishburne’s] incendiary performance can’t ignite Hoodlum, a
would- be gangster epic that generates less heat than a nickel cigar. . . .
Fishburne's Bumpy is fierce, magnetic, irresistible. . . . But even this

advertisements for certain movies. A studio has also constructed a phony fan web site
for a movie. Welkos, supra, note 35.
36

Wayne Friedman, Sony Woes Stir Studio Concerns: Executives Fear an Invitation
for Regulation Looms, ADVERTISING AGE, June 25, 2001, at 4.
37

Nat Ives, The U.S. Plans to See if There is Misleading Marketing of Movies, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2003, at C12, available at LEXIS, News Library (quoting the Federal
Trade Commission’s Associate Director for Advertising Practices as explaining that
“[w]e get many, many complaints about many issues, including serious health and
safety issues, or significant monetary loss to consumers”).

38

Lawrence Van Gelder, Arts, Briefly, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at E2, available at
LEXIS, News Library.

39

Andrew Gumbel, Sony Penalised for Faking Film ‘Blurbs’, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Mar. 13, 2002, at 3, available at LEXIS, News Library.
40

Media Release, State of Oregon Department of Justice, Attorney General Files
Action Against Sony Pictures for Deceptive Advertising of Movies (Apr. 8, 2002),
available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/rel081301.htm.
These Oregon
charges also involved Sony’s use of employees posing as ordinary moviegoers to
provide testimonials in advertisements for certain movies. Id.
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actor . . . can only do so much.”41 In 2003, the Federal Trade
Commission began reviewing its guidelines regarding how studios can use
movie reviews to promote movies.42 These rules prevent using part of a
review out of context to suggest that the critic gave a more positive review
than the critic actually gave.43
There is also evidence that studios try to bias the reviews of some
critics. Studios have sometimes retaliated against critics who given
particularly bad reviews about the studio’s movies. This retaliation has
often taken the form of temporarily banning the offending critic from preopening screenings of the studios movies.44
In addition, studios routinely hold press junkets in which reporters
and movie critics are invited to attend the screening of an upcoming movie
and to interview the movie’s stars, directors, and/or producers.45 The
hosting studio often pays for the airfare, expensive hotel rooms, meals, and
even spending money for some critics who attend.46 Many observers have
expressed concern that such payments biases critics.47 They point to the
41

Leora Broydo, (Not Such a) Thriller!, MOTHER JONES (Nov. – Dec. 1997),
available at http://www.motherjones.com/new/outfront/1997/11/broydo.html
42

Nat Ives, The U.S. plans to see if there is misleading marketing of movies, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2003, at C12, available at LEXIS, News Library; Pamela
McClintock, FTC reviewing movie blurb guidelines, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 10, 2003,
at 8, available at LEXIS, News Library.
43

A Federal Trade Commission Advertising Guide warns that “any alteration in or
quotation from the text of the review which does not fairly reflect its substance would
be a violation of the standards . . . .” FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements
and Testimonials in Advertising §255.0(d), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
guides/endorse.htm.
44

Glenn Lovell, Movies and Manipulation, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
January/February 1993, available at http://archives.cjr.org/year/97/1/movies.asp. For
example, even Roger Ebert and Gene Siskel were banned from screenings by 20th
Century Fox for a couple of weeks because they had spoke badly of the movie Nuns
on the Run during their appearance on the Live with Regis and Kathie Lee television
show. Id.
45

Robert W. Welkos & Rachel Abramowitz, Scathing Reviews of Junkets, L.A.
TIMES, July 20, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL 2504461.

46

Mathew Hays, The Trouble with Junkets, MONTREAL MIRROR, June 14, 2001,
available at http://www.montrealmirror.com/ARCHIVES/2001/061401/film1.html.
47

Dana Kennedy, Where a Nose for News May be Out of Joint, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
2001, at 2A, available at 2001 WL 21727468; Welkos & Abramowitz, supra note 45;
John Horn, NEWSWEEK, June 11, 2001, at 8, available at LEXIS, News Library
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fact that press junket attendees are often the source of the positive blurbs
that are featured in advertising for movies that the vast majority of critics
dislike.48 Indeed, at the junkets, studio employees sometimes have even
tried to get critics who attend to consent to being quoted as giving a
positive blurb that was actually written by the studio.49
In response to these concerns, a consumer group filed a lawsuit
against ten studios that provide such junkets, claiming that the junkets
were in essence payoffs to have the critics write positive reviews of the
movie.50 Others have called on the Federal Trade Commission to
investigate the propriety of these junkets.51 As a result of such concerns,
critics from major publications generally refuse payments from studios for
attending the junkets, and sometimes their employers do not even permit
them to attend at all.52

(referring to the junket circuit as a “scandal” and as an “all-expenses-paid gravy train
where the studios give journalists free rooms and meals at posh hotels and the
reporters return the favor with puffy celebrity profiles and enthusiastic review
blurbs”); Tom Alesia, Film’s Press Event Sends Him Reeling, WIS. ST. J., July 12,
2002, at D1, available at LEXIS, News Library (wondering, upon seeing rave reviews
of a movie by junket attendees, whether “the post-screening party, featuring
boomerang-sized shrimp and filet mignon, influence[d] critics tastes?”).
48

Welkos & Abramowitz, supra note 45.

49

Roger Ebert, Columbia fakes it to the next level, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 5, 2001, at
35, LEXIS, News Library (“In one [documented] case . . . a publicist wrote up
several ‘sample’ quotes and asked the junketeers to sign up for the ones they liked”);
Telephone Interview with Dann Gire, President, Chicago Film Critics Association
(April 14, 2004).
50

The suit claimed that advertisements using quotes from junket attendees constitute
fraudulent concealment, unfair business practices and false and misleading
advertising, in violation of California law.
Watch out, David Manning:
Blurbmeisters get sued (July 3, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/SHOWBIZ/
News/07/03/film.junkets.reut. The suit has since been dismissed. Telephone
Interview with Anthony Sonnet, plaintiffs lead attorney (Aug. 3, 2004).

51

Steve Persall, This Column is Wickedly Smart! A Must-Read!, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2003, at D1, available at 2003 WL 12204651 (Claiming that
“[f]rankly, some movie reviewers’ opinions seen in ads are purchased. . . . [Junket
attendees who attend at the studio’s expense] know if they keep saying nice things
and doing puff pieces, they’ll be invited back,” and calling for the Federal Trade
Commission to investigate this phenomenon).
52

Kennedy, supra note 47.
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In Section III, this Article will empirically examine whether another
source of movie reviews should also treated skeptically: reviews from
media outlets affiliated with the studio that distributed the movie. Indeed,
within the community of movie critics, there is awareness of the conflict
of interest that critics from such media outlets face.53
Even if such bias in movie reviews exists, some observers might
be less concerned if consumers were aware of this conflict of interest.
Then, consumers might be skeptical of reviews from critics affiliated with
the movie’s distributor. However, consumers are unlikely to know that
such a conflict of interest exists. To be aware of such a conflict,
consumers would have to know (1) which studio distributes the movie, (2)
the parent company of that studio, and (3) the parent company of the
media outlet that produced the movie review. Although no such study of
consumers’ knowledge could be found, the author’s personal experience is
that, with the exception of some animated Disney movies, consumers are
generally unaware even of which studios are involved with particular
movies.
Of course, this lack of consumer knowledge could be remedied if
the media outlets that carry reviews disclose to consumers when a conflict
of interest exists. However, no disclosure policy exists for movie critics.
While collecting the data for this Article, no movie review was found that
disclosed the critic’s affiliation with the movie’s distributor.54 In addition,
as will be discussed later in this Article, other research indicates that
disclosure may be unhelpful and sometimes even harmful, to consumers.
Like movie critics who work for media conglomerates, research
analysts who work for financial services conglomerates also face conflicts
of interest that can bias their investment recommendations. The next
section of this Article discusses the conflicts facing these research
analysts, how the conflicts have harmed investors, and how Congress, the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the courts have attempted to
regulate the conflicts.

53

54

Telephone Interview with Dann Gire, supra note 49.

In its news stories about Warner Brothers movies, CNN.com – the website of the
Cable News Network, which is also owned by Time Warner – discloses its conflicts
of interest. For example, in a news story about the casting of Warner Brothers’
Batman Begins movie, CNN.com warns that “Warner Bros. is a division of AOL
Time Warner, as is CNN”. Christian Bale to be new Batman, Sep. 12, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/SHOWBIZ/Movies/09/12/film.batman.ap/
index.html. Strangely, however, in its reviews of Warner Brothers movies, CNN.com
makes no such disclosure.

14

VOL

:

II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FACING RESEARCH
ANALYSTS
Research analysts can face significant conflicts of interest. One
type of conflict of interest exists when analysts own stock in the
companies they cover. Because an analyst’s recommendation regarding a
stock can cause its price to rise or fall,55 the analyst has an incentive to
recommend stocks that the analyst owns because the analyst will
personally financially benefit from the price rise.
Research analysts who work for the research department of a
financial conglomerate that has both a research department and an
investment banking department face an additional conflict of interest.
Investors seek the research department’s sincere recommendations
regarding the investment potential, or forecasts of the financial
performance, of specific companies. In addition, companies pay for
underwriting and other services provided by the investment banking
department. A conflict of interest exists because a recommendation by the
research department to investors to purchase a stock can help the research
analyst’s firm secure investment banking business from the stock’s
issuer.56 Research analysts’ compensation was sometimes even explicitly
based upon the amount of investment banking business the analyst helped
bring in.57
This conflict of interest has become more common in recent years
as consolidation in the financial services industry has increasingly brought
55

D. Casey Kobi, Wall Street v. Main Street: The Regulation’s New FD and its
Impact on Market Participants, 77 IND. L. J. 551, 583 (2002).

56

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 3 (“Firms must compete
with one another for investment banking business. Favorable analyst coverage of a
company may induce that company to hire the firm to underwrite a securities
offering.”).

57

Id; Randall Smith, Will Investors Benefit from Wall Street Split?, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Dec. 23, 2002, at C1, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 103129450 (“A troubling
pattern regulators found was that [investment] bankers and [research] analysts would
pitch for deals as ‘a team . . . . The pitch to issuers was, ‘You’re getting us as
investment bankers and you’re getting so-and-so as the analyst,’ and corporate
executives could ‘meet and touch and feel’ the analysts. It became collusive and
there’s simply no hiding that the analysts were paid in part for bringing in the
business, and they weren’t going to keep getting that business with negative
ratings.’”) (quoting Mary Schapiro, NASD's Vice Chairman and President of
Regulatory Policy and Oversight).

15

VOL

:

research departments and investment banking departments under the same
roof in a financial conglomerate.58 In addition, the pressures on research
analysts that result from this conflict have increased as firms’ investment
banking businesses have become more important; falling prices for
brokerage services have caused investment banking profits to become a
greater percentage of financial institutions’ income.59
Unfortunately many research analysts succumbed to this conflict
of interest. These analysts gave positive forecasts and recommendations
regarding certain companies’ stocks to secure investment banking business
from those companies.60 As a result, readers of the research analysts’
reports were unknowingly obtaining biased forecasts and
recommendations,61 causing millions of “[r]egular people . . . [to lose] a
collective fortune by relying on the tainted advice of the biggest and most
trusted names in the world of finance.”62
On April 8, 2002, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
captured headlines when his office secured a court order requiring Merrill
Lynch to provide increased disclosure of its research analysts’ conflicts of
interest.63 The court ordered Merrill Lynch, in its public research reports
or ratings of any company, to disclose any recent or prospective
58

Christine M. Bae & Carlton R. Asher, Jr., Chinese Walls – Procedures and
Remedies for Dealing with Conflicts of Interest and Other Abuses by Broker-Dealers
in Connection With Conduct by Their Securities Analysts, PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 123, 146
PLI Order No. B0-01A6 (Aug. 2002).
59

Id.

60

Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of
Underwriting Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653 (2000); Patricia M.
Dechow, Amy P. Hutton, Richard G. Sloan, The Relation between Analysts’
Forecasts of Long-Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following
Equity Offerings, 17 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1 (2000).
61

SEC Final Rule: Regulation Analyst Certification (17 C.F.R. § 242 (2003)),
available at http:/www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8193.htm (stating that the SEC is
“particularly concerned that many investors who rely on analysts’ recommendations
may not know, among other things, that favorable research coverage could be used to
market the investment banking services provided by an analyst’s firm.”).

62

Testimony of NY State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer before U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism at 12 (June 26,
2002), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/062602spitzer.pdf.

63

Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch Analysts Told to Change Ways, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 9, 2002, at C1, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3391156.
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investment banking relationship that it had with the subject company of
the report or rating.64
Attorney General Spitzer’s ten-month investigation leading to the
order found that Merrill Lynch’s research department had issued positive
public recommendations of certain companies’ stocks to secure investment
banking business from those companies.65 An affidavit Spitzer’s office
filed with the Court provided documents showing that Merrill Lynch had
publicly recommended that investors purchase a number of internet stocks
while, at the same time, famed internet industry analyst Henry Blodget and
other Merrill Lynch’s research analysts were privately disparaging the
investments. For example, in internal e-mails, Merrill’s research analysts
were saying that some of the recommended stocks were “piece[s] of junk,”
“piece[s] of shit,” and had underlying businesses that were “falling
apart.”66
These revelations focused the public spotlight on how the desire
for investment banking revenue was causing bias in research analysts’
reports and ratings. However, many who were familiar with the industry
were already aware of the problem. Academic studies had uncovered
much evidence of bias. For example, Michaely and Womak had found
that stocks recommended by the underwriters’ research analysts perform
worse than stocks recommended by unaffiliated research analysts.67 Also,
Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan had found that research analysts employed by
the lead managers of equity offerings make more overly optimistic longterm growth forecasts of the offering company than do other research
analysts.68
In addition, Congress had recently held hearings to investigate the
role of research analysts in the creation -- and subsequent bursting -- of the

64

In addition, Merrill Lynch was ordered to disclose, in all its public research reports
and ratings, the percentage of stocks in the subject company’s sector or industry that
it places in each of the rating categories it used. Id.

65

Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Merrill
Lynch Stock Rating System Found Biased by Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest (April
8, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/apr08b_02.html.

66

Affidavit of Eric R. Dinallo in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to
General Business Law Section 354 at 11-13 (Apr. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf.

67

Michaely & Womack, supra note 60.

68

Dechow et al., supra note 60.
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internet stock price bubble.69 In July 2001, then acting SEC Chair Laura
Unger testified before a Congressional subcommittee that “there is a mood
of skepticism about analysts’ stock recommendations. This skepticism is
due, in large part, to a blurring of the lines between research and
investment banking.”70
In response to such concerns, limited steps toward investigating
and addressing research analysts’ conflicts of interest were being taken.
The SEC conducted on-site examinations of a number of financial
institutions that had both investment banking departments and research
departments.71 These examinations focused on the conflicts of interest
that research analysts face because of their “financial interests in the
companies they cover, reporting structures, and compensation
arrangements.”72
Also, the Securities Industry Association – a trade organization
composed of more than 600 securities firms -- produced a set of “Best
Practices for Research” guidelines.73 These “best practices” included
separating research departments from investment banking departments,
and disclosing analysts’ personal financial interests in the companies they
covered.74 Despite these “best practices” guidelines being voluntary and
69

Karen Contoudis, Analyst Conflicts of Interests: Are the NASD and NYSE Rules
Enough?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP.& FIN. L. 123, 124 (2003).

70

Written Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and
Their Research Analysts: Hearings on the Quality of Wall Street Research Before the
House Subcomm. On Capital Markets, Insurance and Gov’t Spronsored Enterprises,
106th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Unger Testimony] (testimony of Laura S. Unger,
Acting Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101tslu.htm.
71

Written Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and
Their Research Analysts: Hearings on the Quality of Wall Street Research Before the
House Subcomm. On Capital Markets, Insurance and Gov’t Spronsored Enterprises,
106th Cong. (2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101tslu.htm.

72

Written Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and
Their Research Analysts: Hearings on the Quality of Wall Street Research Before the
House Subcomm. On Capital Markets, Insurance and Gov’t Spronsored Enterprises,
106th Cong. (2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101tslu.htm.

73

Information about the Securities Industry Association is available at
http://www.sia.com/about_sia/.

74

Kelly S. Sullivan, Comment, Serving Two Masters: Securities Analyst Liability and
Regulation in the Face of Pervasive Conflicts of Interest, 70 UMKC L. REV. 415,
429-30 (2001).
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unenforceable,75 some members of the Securities Industry Association
officially adopted at least some of the guidelines.76 In addition, in July
2001, Merrill Lynch became the first major securities firm to prohibit its
research analysts from owning stock of companies the analysts cover.77
Following Spitzer’s suit against Merrill Lynch, more dramatic
actions followed. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which in part
gave the SEC the mandate to promulgate rules, or to direct national
securities exchanges and associations to create rules, to address research
analysts’ conflicts of interest.78
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act specified that these rules should focus on
a number of areas. First, they should restrict the prepublication clearance
or approval of research reports by persons who are not directly responsible
for such research, and especially by persons engaged in investment
banking.79 Second, they should prevent investment bankers from
supervising, or determining the compensation of, research analysts.80
Third, they should prevent actual or threatened retaliation by investment
bankers against research analysts who issue unfavorable research reports
about a company that is a current or prospective investment banking
client.81 Fourth, they should define periods of time around a company’s
public offering of securities during which research analysts who work for
brokers or dealers cannot issue research reports relating to that issuer.82
Fifth, the rules should “establish structural and institutional safeguards
within [the firms] to assure that [research] analysts are separated by
appropriate informational partitions within the firm from the review,

75

Id. at 430-31 (the Securities Industry Association lacks enforcement power over its
members).

76

Ray Hennessey et al., Guidelines Aim to Polish Analysts’ Image, WALL ST. J., June
13, 2001, at C1, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2866390.

77

Charles Gasparino & Jeff D. Opdyke, Merrill Lynch Alters a Policy on Analysts,
WALL ST. J., July 11, 2001, at C1, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2869178.
78

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §501, 116 Stat. 745.

79

Id. at §501(a)(1)(A).

80

Id. at §501(a)(1)(B).

81

Id. at §501(a)(1)(C).

82

Id. at §501(a)(2).
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pressure or oversight of those whose involvement in investment banking
activities might potentially bias their judgment or supervision.”83
Sarbanes-Oxley also required the adoption of rules requiring the
disclosure, when a research analyst issues a research report or makes a
public appearance, of the analyst’s conflicts of interest.84 These
disclosures must include the extent to which the analyst has investments in
the securities of the company that is the subject of the report or
appearance,85 whether either the analyst or the analyst’s employer has
received compensation from the company,86 the extent to which the
company has been a client of the analyst’s employer during the last year,87
and whether the analyst’s compensation for the research report was based
at least partly on the analyst’s employer’s investment banking revenues.88
To satisfy these dictates of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC approved a
number of changes to the rules of the New York Stock Exchange
(“NYSE”) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”).
On May 10, 2002, the SEC approved amendments to NYSE Rules 472
(“Communications with the Public”) and 351 (“Reporting Requirements”)
and approved a new NASD Rule 2711 (“Research Analysts and Research
Reports).89 In December 2002 and May 2003, the NYSE and NASD filed
proposed amendments to their research analyst conflict of interest rules
with the SEC.90 In July 2003, the SEC approved these additional changes

83

Id. at §501(a)(3). The statute also allows the SEC or association or exchange to
“address such other issues as the Commission, or such association or exchange,
determines appropriate.” Id. at §501(a)(4).
84

Id. at §501(b).

85

Id. at §501(b)(1).

86

Id. at §501(b)(2).

87

Id. at §501(b)(3).

88

Id. at §501(b)(4). The statute also requires that the SEC or the association or
exchange mandate disclosure of any other “material” conflicts of interest that it deems
appropriate. Id. at §501(b)(5).

89

90

SR-NYSE-2002-09, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 45908 (May 10, 2002).

Samuel Winer, Amy N. Kroll, Adam J. Eisner, Recent SRO Rules Regarding
Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest 203, 205 (ALI - ABA Continuing Legal
Education) (Jan. 8-9, 2004), available in WESTLAW at SK057 ALI-ABA 203.
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as well.91 In the same month, the NYSE and NASD filed additional
proposed amendments to their rules, which the SEC also approved.92
These rules and regulations can be grouped into three broad
categories: (1) those designed to make research analysts independent,
especially from their firms’ investment bankers; (2) those designed to
prevent research analysts from having a personal financial stake in the
effect of their coverage on the companies they cover; and (3) those
requiring public disclosure of research analysts’ conflicts of interests.
Several of these rules are aimed at ensuring that research analysts
work independently, especially from their firm’s investment bankers. For
example, NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 mandate that research
analysts may not be “subject to the supervision or control” of an employee
of the investment banking department.93 Also, no one involved with
investment banking activities may “directly or indirectly, retaliate against
or threaten to retaliate against” a research analyst who makes an
unfavorable research report or public appearance that might adversely
affect the firm’s current or potential investment banking relationship with
the subject company.94 In addition, except to verify the accuracy of facts
in the report or to identify a potential conflict of interest, non-research
personnel may not review a research report before its publication.95 Also,
research analysts are forbidden to participate in the solicitation of
investment banking business.96
To assure their independence, research analysts’ communications
with the companies they cover are also restricted. Except to verify its
factual accuracy, the subject of a research report may not be sent a copy of
the report before its publication.97 In addition, the subject company cannot
be given significant advance notice of a research analyst’s intent to change
the analyst’s rating of the company.98
91

Id.

92

Id.

93

NASD Rule 2711(b)(1) and NYSE Rule 472(b)(1).

94

NASD Rule 2711(j) and NYSE Rule 472(g)(2).

95

NASD Rule 2711(b)(2)-(3) and NYSE Rule 472(b)(2)-(3).

96

NASD Rule 2711(c)(4) and NYSE Rule 472(b)(5).

97

NASD Rule 2711(c)(1)-(2) and NYSE Rule 472(c)(4).

98

NASD Rule 2711(c)(3) and NYSE Rule 472(c)(4)(iii).
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Other of the rules prohibit firms from promising favorable
coverage of a company in exchange for compensation or that company’s
investment banking business. Research analysts are generally forbidden
from publishing or distributing research reports, and from making public
appearances, regarding a company soon after the analyst’s firm was a
manager or co-manager of a securities offering by that company.99 There
is a similar prohibition for a period after an initial public offering in which
the analyst’s company participates, or agrees to participate, as an
underwriter or dealer.100 In addition, if coverage of a company is
terminated, the firm must give notice of this termination and generally
must produce a final research report on the company.101
Other rules are directly focused on preventing research analysts
from having a financial incentive to help the investment banking
department. Research analysts cannot receive any compensation based
upon a specific investment banking services transaction.102 In addition,
the committee that approves analysts’ compensation cannot have a
representative of the investment banking department.103 Also, the
analyst’s contribution to the firm’s investment banking business, and the
views of the firm’s investment banking department regarding the analyst,
cannot be a factor in the analyst’s compensation.104
To prevent analysts from having a personal financial interest in
how their reports affect the securities prices of the companies they cover,
restrictions are also put on research analysts’ personal trading of securities.
For example, an analyst is prohibited in general from buying or selling any
security of a company around the time that the analyst’s firm publishes a
research report on the company or changes the rating or price target of the
company’s securities.105 In addition, a research analyst may not acquire a
99

NASD Rule 2711(f)(1) and NYSE Rule 472(f)(1)-(2). An exception is made for
reports and public appearances concerning significant events that happen to the
company. NASD Rule 2711(f)(1)(B)(i) and NYSE Rule 472(f)(5).
100

NASD Rule 2711(f)(2) and NYSE Rule 472(f)(3).

101

NASD Rule 2711(f)(5) and NYSE Rule 472(f)(6).

102

NASD Rule 2711(d)(1) and NYSE Rule 472(h)(1).

103

NASD Rule 2711(d)(2) and NYSE Rule 472(h)(2).

104

NASD Rule 2711(d)(2) and NYSE Rule 472(h)(2).

105

Such purchases are prohibited from 30 days before the report or change in rating or
price target is issued until five days after its issuance. An exception exists for
transactions in the 30 days preceding the issuance of a report or rating or price change
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company’s securities before its initial public offering if the issuer is
“principally engaged in the same types of business” as companies that the
research analyst follows.106 Also, in general, a research analyst may not
transact in any security in a manner inconsistent with the analyst’s most
recently published report regarding the issuer.107 For example, in general,
an analyst may not sell a stock if the analyst’s most recent report
recommends that investors purchase the stock. Furthermore, legal or
compliance personnel of the research analyst’s employer must pre-approve
any transactions by persons who oversee research analysts if the
transactions are of equity securities of a company covered by those
analysts.108
The last type of new rule requires disclosure of a research analyst’s
conflicts of interest. These disclosures must be “clear, comprehensive,
and prominent.”109 Some of the rules require the disclosure of the analyst’s
personal financial interest in the subject company or in the analyst’s firm’s
investment banking revenues. They require in research reports110 the
disclosure of the existence and nature of any financial interest the analyst
or a member of the analyst’s household has in the securities of the subject
company;111 whether the analyst or a member of the analyst’s household is
a director, officer, or advisory board member of the subject company;112
and any other “actual, material conflict of interest” of the analyst or the
analyst’s firm.113 In addition, research reports must disclose if the analyst

made in response to significant news regarding the company. NASD Rule 2711(g)(2)
and NYSE Rule 472(e)(2).
106

NASD Rule 2711(g)(1) and NYSE Rule 472(e)(1).

107

NASD Rule 2711(g)(3) and NYSE Rule 472(e)(3).

108

NASD Rule 2711(g)(6) and NYSE Rule 472(e)(5).

109

NASD Rule 2711(h)(10) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1). In addition, the disclosures
either must be on the front page of the research report, or the front page of the report
must refer to the page where the disclosures are located. Id.

110

The disclosure requirements for public appearances by research analysts are
similar to the disclosure requirements for research reports.

111

NASD Rule 2711(h)(1)(A) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(iii)(b).

112

NASD Rule 2711(h)(3) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(iii)(c).

113

NASD Rule 2711(h)(1)(C) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(iii)(d).

23

VOL

:

has received compensation based on the analyst’s firm’s investment
banking revenues or from the subject company of the report.114
The analyst’s firm’s business with the subject company must also
be disclosed. Generally, disclosure is required of whether the analyst’s
firm has recently managed or co-managed a public offering of the subject
company, or if the firm or an affiliate of the firm has recently received or
expects to soon receive or seek compensation from the subject company
for investment banking and/or other services and products.115 It must also
be disclosed if the firm is making a market in the subject company’s
securities.116
Finally, information related to the rating system the analyst uses to
rate securities must also be disclosed in the research reports. Each rating
used in the rating system – such as “Strong Buy”, “Neutral”, and “Sell” –
must be defined.117 Also, these definitions must be “consistent with [the
ratings’] plain meaning.”118 Second, the report must provide information
about the distribution of ratings given by all the employer’s analysts.
Specifically, it must state both the percentage of covered companies, and
the percentage of covered companies for which the employer has recently
provided investment banking services, that would receive “Buy,”
“Hold/Neutral,” or “Sell” rating (even if the analyst uses a different rating
system).119 The report also must contain a graph that displays the
security’s past daily closing prices and the analyst’s rating and price target
changes.120
In addition to approving these changes in the rules of the NYSE
and NASD, the SEC adopted Regulation Analyst Certification

114

NASD Rule 2711(h)(2)(A)(i) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(ii)(a).

115

NASD Rule 2711(h)(2)(A)(ii) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(i)(a).

116

NASD Rule 2711(h)(8) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(i)(b).

117

NASD Rule 2711(h)(4) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(f).

118

NASD Rule 2711(h)(4) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(f).

119

NASD Rule 2711(h)(5)(A)-(B) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(g).

120

NASD Rule 2711(h)(6) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(h). This requirement only
exists for securities that have been rated for at least one year. The graph must contain
data for the lesser of three years or the period for which the company has been rated.
Id.
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(“Regulation AC”), which also required certain disclosures.121 Regulation
AC requires that research reports disclose whether the analyst received any
payments in connection with the specific recommendations or views
expressed in the report.122 The research analyst must also certify that the
views expressed in the report accurately reflect the analyst’s own views.123
In addition to these rule and regulation changes, a number of
lawsuits were filed in response to research analysts’ bias. First, a number
of private suits have sought damages on behalf of investors who allegedly
lost money by relying on biased research reports.124 Also, as discussed
above, on April 28, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
New York Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities
Dealers, the North American Securities Administrators Association, the
New York Attorney General, and state securities regulators brought and
settled joint enforcement actions against ten large securities firms and two
individuals.125 These actions alleged that all the firms had “supervisory
deficiencies” and “engaged in acts and practices that created or maintained
inappropriate influence by investment banking over research analysts,
thereby imposing conflicts of interest on research analysts that the firms
failed to manage in an adequate or appropriate manner.”126
As part of the global settlement, the firms paid a total of $1.4
billion in fines, disgorgement, and the funding of independent research and

121

Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Amends Definition of
“Dealer” for Banks, Adopts Analyst Certification Rule (Feb. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-21.html.

122

17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a)(2) (2003).

123

17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a)(1) (2003). Similar disclosure requirements exist for views
expressed in public appearances by an analyst. 17 C.F.R. § 242.502 (2003).

124

Margo McCall, NY Probe Spurs New Brand of Lawsuit, WIRELESS WEEK, July 22,
2002, available at http://www.wirelessweek.com/article/CA234275?spacedesc=
Business%2FFinance&st t=001.
125

Joint Press Release, SEC, New York Attorney General, North American Securities
Administrators Association, NASD, NYSE, and state securities regulators, Ten of
Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of
Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Joint
Press Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
126

Id. Other charges specific to particular firms were also made. Id.
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investor education.127 Other terms of the settlement agreement required
structural changes in the firms to increase their research analysts’
independence from their investment bankers.
These changes are
consistent with the recently adopted SEC, NYSE, and NASD rules and
regulations discussed above. Among the most important changes is the
creation of firewalls and physical separation between research and
investment banking departments of the firms, including prohibiting
research analysts from participating in the solicitation of investment
banking business.128 Also, the firms’ investment bankers are prevented
from having input into the determination of the research departments’
budgets.129 In addition, the investment bankers are prohibited from
evaluating research analysts’ performance and from having even indirect
input into research analysts’ compensation.130 Also, research analysts’
compensation cannot be even indirectly based on the firms’ investment
banking revenues.131
The global settlement also imposed a disclosure requirement. The
ten firms must make publicly available historical information on the
ratings and stock price target forecasts their research analysts gave.132
This disclosure is intended to “enable investors to evaluate and compare
the performance of analysts.”133
In summary, the combination of the reforms imposed by the SEC,
NASD, NYSE, and the global settlement are causing significant changes
in the industry. However, the rationale for these reforms are based upon
assumptions regarding what causes bias in research reports and harm to
investors: (1) research analysts lacking independence, (2) research
analysts having personal financial stakes in how their reports affect the
prices of the securities of the subjects of their reports, and (3) insufficient
127

This was composed of $475.5 million in fines, $387.5 million in disgorgement,
$432.5 million to fund independent research and $80 million to fund investor
education. Id.

128

Id.

129

Id.

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, NASD, NYSE, and state
securities regulators (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/factsheet.htm.
133

Joint Press Release, supra note 125.
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disclosure of analysts’ conflicts of interest. This article empirically
examines the experience of movie critics, who face a situation similar to
those facing research analysts, for evidence of whether these assumptions
are correct, and thus whether these reforms are likely to actually reduce
analysts’ bias.
III. TESTING FOR BIAS IN MOVIE REVIEWS
This Article empirically examines whether there is bias in the
movie reviews of media outlets affiliated with movie studios. To do this,
the Article examines three media conglomerates that own movie studios
and own media outlets that review movies: The Walt Disney Company,
Time Warner Inc., and The News Corporation Limited. The first part of
this section describes the data used in this study. The second part of this
section describes the empirical methodology used to test for bias and
presents the results of this analysis.
A. Data
The media outlets, movie critics, and movie studios involved in
this study are summarized in Table 1. The Walt Disney Company is the
world’s second largest media and entertainment conglomerate with more
than $30 billion in revenue in fiscal year 2004.134 Among its operations is
the production and distribution of films through businesses including Walt
Disney Pictures, Touchtone Pictures, and Miramax Films.135 It also owns
Buena Vista Television, which distributes the popular Ebert & Roeper and
the Movies (“Ebert & Roeper”) television show, which each week features
movie critics Roger Ebert and Richard Roeper reviewing movies.136 Ebert
& Roeper appears on more than 200 television stations and is the “toprated first-run weekly syndicated half-hour on television.”137

134

Disney’s fiscal year ends in September.
Hoovers
http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?ID=11603

Online,

at

135

Who Owns What: The Walt Disney Company, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/disney.asp.
136

137

Id.

Movies.com, Ebert & Roeper, at http://tvplex.go.com/buenavista/ebertandroeper/
bios/ebert.html.
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TABLE 1
Movie Studio Ownership

Critics’ Media
Outlet
Ebert & Roeper

Primary Critics

Parent
Company

Movie Companies
Owned by Parent

Roger Ebert

Walt Disney Co.

Walt Disney Pictures

Richard Roeper

Touchstone Pictures
Miramax Films
Dimension Films
Hollywood Pictures
Buena Vista Intl.

Entertainment Weekly

Owen Glieberman

Time Warner Inc.

Lisa Schwarzbaum

Warner Bros. Pictues
New Line Cinema
Fine Line Features

New York Post

Jonathan Foreman

News Corp. Ltd.

Lou Lumenick

th

20 Century Fox
Fox Searchlight
Pictures

Time Warner Inc. is the world’s largest media and entertainment
company with revenue of over $42 billion in 2004.138 Among its
operations is the production and distribution of films through businesses
including Warner Brothers Pictures, New Line Cinema, and Fine Line
Features.139 It also owns numerous print and broadcast news outlets that
carry movie reviews, including Entertainment Weekly magazine, CNN,
Time magazine , and People magazine.140 However, limits on the
138

Time Warner’s fiscal year ends in December.
Hoovers Online, at
http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?COID=102518.

139

Who Owns What:
Time Warner, COLUM.
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/timewarner.asp.

140

Id.

JOURNALISM REV.,

at
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availability of data restrict this Article to analyzing Entertainment
Weekly’s movie reviews.
Entertainment Weekly is a weekly national magazine focusing on
the entertainment industry and has a paid circulation of almost 1.8
million.141 In addition to reporting movie reviews made by certain outside
reviewers, it also carries the reviews of its own staff of reviewers. During
the time period encompassed by this study, five critics reviewed movies
for Entertainment Weekly itself, however, two of them – Owen
Gleiberman and Lisa Schwarzbaum -- accounted for more than ninety
percent of the reviews.
The News Corporation Limited is an international media
conglomerate headed by Rupert Murdoch with more than $20 billion in
revenue in fiscal year 2004.142 Among it businesses is the production and
distribution of movies through its 20th Century Fox and Fox Searchlight
Pictures subsidiaries.143 In addition, it owns numerous print and broadcast
news outlets, including the New York Post.144
The New York Post, a daily newspaper with a circulation of
approximately 620,000,145 regularly prints movie reviews by its critics.
During the time period encompassed by this study, five critics reviewed
movies for the New York Post, however, two of them – Jonathan Foreman
and Lou Lumenick – accounted for more than ninety-five percent of the
reviews.146
To test whether bias exists in media conglomerates’ movie
reviews, this paper empirically examines whether Ebert & Roeper’s
141

Jenna Schnuer, Time’s tactics show a way out, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 15, 2004,
at S-6, available at LEXIS, News Library.
142

News Corporation’s fiscal year ends in June.
Hoovers Online, at
http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?COID=41816.
143
Who Owns What:
News Corporation, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/newscorp.asp.
144

Id.

145

Jon Fine, Inside the NYC Tabloid Wars: ‘Post’ Gains Circulation; ‘Daily News’
Plans Major Changes, AD AGE, Oct. 13, 2003, available at
http://www.adage.com/news.coms?newsID-38934.

146

The News Corporation Limited also owns many local television stations in the
United States, some of which broadcast movie reviews occasionally as part of their
news broadcasts. Who Owns What: News Corporation, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
at http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/newscorp.asp. However, access to these reviews
is unavailable so they are not included in this study.
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reviews are biased in favor of Disney movies, whether Entertainment
Weekly’s reviews are biased in favor of Time Warner movies, and whether
the New York Post’s reviews are biased in favor of News Corporation
movies.
This paper uses the 1,082 movies that appeared in the “Crix Picks”
section of Variety magazine and opened in the United States from January
1, 2000, through March 31, 2003. Variety magazine is sometimes referred
to as the “bible” of the show business industry and is not affiliated with
any movie studio.147 Each week, Variety’s Crix Picks section tabulates
movie reviews from many of the best-known movie critics in the United
States148 for approximately six movies opening that week.149 These
movies include at least the two largest “blockbusters” and at least one
smaller “niche” movie released that week.150 Although there are over 100
critics in the pool from which Variety collects reviews,151 the number of
reviews compiled for any particular movie is much less. For the movies
used in this Article, Variety collected between one and fifty-one reviews,
with an average of seventeen. The number of reviews varies because the
number of critics who review a movie differ; significant films from major
studios are generally reviewed by more critics than are smaller “niche”
films.152 Crix Picks includes all reviews that its pool of critics sends to
Variety, and occasionally Variety will solicit reviews from critics who
have not sent their reviews to Variety in some time.153
Each review collected by Crix Picks is labeled as giving the movie
a favorable review (“Pro”), an unfavorable review (“Con”), or a mixed
review (“Mixed”). The vast majority of the reviewers designate for Crix
147

See, e.g., Anthony DeBarros & Susan Wloszczyna, Movie critics, fans follow
surprisingly similar script, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2004, at A1, available at 2004 WL
58552118.
148

It also compiles reviews from many British critics, however those reviews are not
used in this study.

149

On rare occasions, Crix Picks is not published in a particular week, however,
typically the next Crix Picks’ is expanded to also cover movies released during that
skipped week. Telephone Interview with Jill Feiwell, Assistant Editor, Variety, who
oversees Crix Picks (July 16, 2003).
150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Id.

153

Id.
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Picks which category their review is in.154 For the few critics who do not
choose a category, Variety’s editorial staff reads the reviews and makes
the designation.155
B. Empirical Methodology and Results
Bias in favor of an affiliated studio’s movies can take two forms.
First, bias might exist in the selection of which movies a critic reviews.
Second, bias could exist in the grades a reviewer gives to affiliated
studios’ movies. This article tests for both forms of bias.
1. Bias in the Selection of Movies to Review
Bias in the selection of which movies are reviewed may also take
one of two forms. A media outlet may be more likely to review an
affiliated studio’s films to increase publicity for those films. On the other
hand, the media outlet might be more likely to review good films from that
studio, but less likely to review bad films from that studio to avoid adding
to negative publicity regarding the bad movies. This would allow a critic
who wants to give sincere reviews to still be more likely to give positive
reviews, and less likely to give negative reviews, to affiliated films than do
other critics.
Table 2 presents the number and percentage of movies listed in
Variety’s Crix Pix – broken down by the parent company of the
distributing studio – that were reviewed by each media outlet. It shows
that critics are no more likely to review movies distributed by an affiliated
studio than movies distributed by an unaffiliated studio. In fact, Disneyowned Ebert & Roeper reviewed a smaller percentage of the Disneydistributed movies (78.8%) than of the Time Warner (84.6%) or the News
Corporation movies (87.5%). Similarly, Entertainment Weekly, which is
owned by Time Warner was no more likely to review the Time Warner
movies (95.9%) than the Disney movies (96.6%) or the News Corporation
movies (96.4%) and the New York Post was no more likely to review the
News Corporation movies (100%) than Time Warner (100%) or Disney
movies (99.2%). Indeed, there is no statistically significant difference
between the percentage of affiliated movies and the percentage of
unaffiliated movies that are reviewed by these media outlets.156
154

Id.

155

Id.

156

The null hypothesis tested is that the percentage of movies reviewed is
independent of the parent company of the movies’ distributor. As noted in Table 2,

31

VOL

:

TABLE 2
Percentage of Movies Reviewed

Ebert & Roeper

Disney

Time
Warner

News
Corp.

Parent

(118 movies)

(123 movies)

(56 movies)

Disney

78.8%

84.6%

87.5%

Time
Warner

96.6%

95.9%

96.4%

News
Corp.

99.2%

100.0%

100.0%

(612 movies reviewed)

Entertainment
Weekly
(776 movies reviewed)

New York Post
(1014 movies reviewed)

Chi-squared = 4.06, Degrees of freedom=10 (Not Statistically Significant)

As noted above, bias in the selection of movies to review may
instead take the form of choosing to review higher quality movies from
affiliated studios than from unaffiliated studios. To test for this form of
bias, Table 3 displays the average quality of the movies reviewed by each
media outlet, broken down by the distributing studio. The quality of a
particular movie is measured as the average grade, as reported in Variety’s
Crix Pics, that the movie receives from critics with no affiliation to the
studio that distributed the movie. Thus, a movie’s “quality” is calculated
as the number of favorable reviews minus the number of unfavorable
this null hypothesis cannot be rejected because the chi square statistic is only 4.06,
with 10 degrees of freedom.
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reviews, divided by the total number of reviews. For example, if a movie
had eight favorable reviews, three unfavorable reviews, and nine mixed
reviews, the movie’s “quality” would be 0.25.157 “Quality” ranges from -1
for a movie with only unfavorable reviews to +1 for a movie with only
favorable reviews; the quality of a movie with an equal number of
favorable and unfavorable reviews would be 0.

TABLE 3
Average Quality of Movies Reviewed

Parent
Ebert & Roeper

Disney

Entertainment
Weekly

Time
Warner

New York Post

News
Corp.

Disney
.1710
(93 movies)

Time
Warner
-.0588
(104 movies)

News
Corp.
.0916
(49 movies)

.1407

-.0719

.0224

(114 movies)

(118 movies)

(54 movies)

.1283

-.0792

.0132

(117 movies)

(123 movies)

(56 movies)

As shown in Table 3, critics do not review better affiliated movies
than unaffiliated movies. Although the average Disney movie reviewed
byEbert & Roeper is higher quality (.1710) than the average Time Warner
(-.0588) or News Corporation movie (.0916) it reviews, that appears to be
157

(8 favorable reviews – 3 unfavorable reviews) / (8 favorable reviews + 3
unfavorable reviews + 9 mixed reviews) = 0.25. Note that this methodology is
identical to calculating the value of average review where a favorable review has a
value of +1, an unfavorable review has a value of -1, and each mixed review has a
value of 0.
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due to the fact that the average Disney movie made was of higher quality,
not because of a bias by Ebert & Roeper in favor of Disney movies.
Indeed, the average Disney movie reviewed by Entertainment Weekly and
the New York Post were also higher quality than the average Time Warner
or News Corporation movie that those publications reviewed.
Ebert & Roeper reviewed fewer movies (612 movies) than
Entertainment Weekly (776 movies), which reviewed fewer movies than
the New York Post (1014 movies). It appears that the outlets that reviewed
fewer movies often chose not to review lower quality movies, regardless
of who the distributor was. For each distributor, the average quality of
movie reviewed by Ebert & Roeper was higher than the average quality of
movie reviewed by Entertainment Weekly, which was higher than the
average quality of movie reviewed by the New York Post. Thus, although
Ebert & Roeper and Entertainment Weekly were more likely to review
higher quality movies than lower quality movies, this decision was
independent of which studio distributed the movie. For example, the
difference between the average quality of Disney and News Corporation
movies reviewed was not more for Ebert & Roeper (.0794)158 than it was
for the New York Post (.1151).159 If there was bias in the selection of
movies to review, Ebert & Roeper should exhibit a bigger gap in the
quality of Disney and News Corporation movies it reviews than does the
New York Post. Indeed, an examination of Table 3 demonstrates that,
relative to the other media outlets, none of the media outlets discriminated
in favor of higher quality affiliated movies.
Thus, Tables 2 and 3 provide support for the conclusion that there
is no bias in the selection of which movies are reviewed. However,
additional analysis is necessary to control for other factors that may be
preventing the detection of bias. Thus, a multiple regression analysis is
used in which number of quantifiable, explanatory variables are examined
that may affect the probability that a particular movie is reviewed. The
definitions of these variables are summarized in Table 4.

158

As displayed in Table 3, for Ebert & Roeper, the average quality of Disney movies
reviewed was .1710, and the average quality of News Corporation movies was .0916.
Thus, there was a .0794 difference in the average quality of Disney and News
Corporation movies reviewed.
159

As displayed in Table 3, for the New York Post, the average quality of Disney
movies reviewed was .1283, and the average quality of News Corporation movies was
.0132. Thus there was a .1151 difference in the average quality of Disney and News
Corporation movies reviewed.
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TABLE 4
Definition of Variables
VARIABLE

DEFINITION

Independent
Variables
#_REVIEWS

Number of reviews of movie by unaffiliated
reviewers

NICHE

Movie distributed by a “niche” studio (1=yes,
0=no)

AFFILIATE

Movie is affiliated with the critic (1=yes, 0=no)

QUALITY

Average grade given to movie by unaffiliated
critics

AFFILIATE*QUALITY

Interaction term of AFFILIATE and QUALITY
variables (AFFILIATE multiplied by QUALITY)

Dependent Variables
REVIEW

Movie reviewed by particular media outlet
(1=yes, 0=no)

GRADE

Grade given to movie by the critic

Number of Unaffiliated Reviews
The first explanatory variable, #_REVIEWS, is the number of
reviews reported in Variety’s Crix Picks by reviewers with no affiliation to
the studio that distributed the movie. Specifically, it excludes reviews in
Disney media outlets of Disney studios’ films, reviews in Time Warner
media outlets of films distributed by Time Warner studios, and reviews in

35

VOL

:

News Corporation media outlets of films distributed by News Corporation
studios.
Many of the same factors that lead unaffiliated critics to review a
movie – pre-release publicity, etc. – should also cause affiliated critics to
review it. Thus, all else equal, the more unaffiliated reviewers who
reviewed a certain movie, the more likely that a particular affiliated
reviewer should have reviewed it also.
Niche Studio Movie
NICHE is a dummy variable that denotes whether the film is
distributed by a niche movie studio. NICHE has a value of 1 if the film
was distributed by a niche studio, and a value of 0 if it was distributed
instead by a major studio.160 Films from major studios tend to be higher
profile, have more pre-release publicity, and have wider intended
audiences. Thus, mass-market media outlets, such as Ebert & Roeper,
Entertainment Weekly, and the New York Post, may be less likely to
review movies from niche studios than are other media outlets.
Affiliated Movie
AFFILIATE is a dummy variable that denotes whether the movie
is distributed by a studio affiliated with the media outlet in which the
review appears. AFFILIATE has a value of 1 if a movie is an affiliated
movie, and a value of 0 otherwise. For example, for Entertainment
Weekly, AFFILIATE has a value of 1 if the movie is distributed by a
studio owned by Time Warner, and a value of 0 otherwise. If media
outlets are more likely to review films of affiliated studios then, all else
equal, AFFILIATE should be positively correlated with whether a movie
is reviewed.
As noted above, bias in choosing which movies to review may
take another form instead. Reviewers may be more likely to review good
160

The major studios are those owned by The Walt Disney Company, Dreamworks
L.L.C., Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., Paramount Plc,
Sony Corporation, NBC Universal, Inc., and Time Warner Inc., with the exception of
their niche film studios. The niche studios of these companies are Miramax Zoe
(Disney), Fox Searchlight (News Corp.), United Artists (MGM), Paramount Classics
(Paramount), Screen Gems (Sony), Sony Pictures Classics (Sony), Universal Focus
(Universal), Cinemax (Warner Brothers), Fine Line Features (Warner Brothers), and
HBO (Warner Brothers). Dana Harris, Hollywood Renews Niche Pitch, VARIETY,
Apr. 7, 2003, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library.
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affiliated movies and less likely to review lower quality affiliated movies.
This would allow a critic who wants to give sincere reviews to still be
more likely to give positive reviews, and less likely to give negative
reviews, to affiliated films. To test for this alternative type of bias, two
other explanatory variables are also used: QUALITY and AFFILIATE x
QUALITY.
Quality of Movie
As discussed above, QUALITY is the average grade given to the
movie by unaffiliated reviewers, as reported in Variety’s Crix Picks. It is
calculated as the number of favorable reviews minus the number of
unfavorable reviews, divided by the total number of reviews.
Affiliation and Quality Interaction Term
An interaction term (AFFILIATE x QUALITY) equal to
AFFILIATE multiplied by QUALITY is also included. It is used to test
whether media outlets are more likely to review a good affiliated movie
than a good unaffiliated movie, and whether they are less likely to review
a bad affiliated movie than a bad unaffiliated movie. This interaction
variable will be greater than zero for an affiliated movie that has generally
received positive reviews, less than zero for an affiliated movie that has
generally received negative reviews, and zero for an unaffiliated movie. If
reviewers are more likely to write reviews for good affiliated movies than
for good unaffiliated movies, but less likely to write reviews for bad
affiliated movies than for bad unaffiliated movies, then, all else equal, this
interaction term should be positively correlated with whether a movie is
reviewed.
To test which of these variables help explain which movies are
reviewed, the dependent variable REVIEW – whether a particular movie is
reviewed – is regressed against these independent variables and an
intercept term. This regression is conducted for each of the media outlets:
Ebert & Roeper, Entertainment Weekly, and the New York Post. Because
the dependent variable (REVIEW) has only two possible values (i.e., a
movie is either reviewed or not reviewed), logistic regressions are used.161
The results from these regressions are displayed in Table 5.

161

For a description of logistic regressions see G. S. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT
22-27 (1983).

AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS
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TABLE 5
Determinants of Decision to Review
Logit Estimates
(p-values in parentheses)

Intercept

#_REVIEWS

NICHE

AFFILIATE

QUALITY

AFFILIATE
x
QUALITY

-0.1369
(.5475)

0.1241 ***
(<.0001)

-2.2573 ***
(<.0001)

-0.5477 *
(.0739)

0.6588 ***
(.0001)

0.0556
(.9121)

.3498

Ent. Weekly
(776 movies)

1.405 ***
(.0006)

0.1707 ***
(<.0001)

-3.3278 ***
(<.0001)

0.7261
(.2390)

0.5145 ***
(.0033)

1.0298
(.2682)

.4361

N.Y. Post
(1014 movies)

0.4813
(.3797)

0.3856 ***
(<.0001)

-0.7186
(.1700)

Positive
(>.2500)

0.0657
(.7685)

N/A
N/A

.3624

Ebert & Roeper
(612 movies)

Pseudo
R2

*
Statistically significant at the 10 percent level
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level

As expected, the estimated coefficients of the #_REVIEWS
variable are positive and statistically significant for all three media outlets.
As noted, many of the same factors that lead unaffiliated critics to review a
movie, such as pre-release publicity, should also cause affiliated critics to
review it. The results confirm that, all else equal, the more unaffiliated
reviewers who review a certain movie, the more likely that a particular
affiliated reviewer will review it also.
Also, all three media outlets were less likely to review movies
distributed by niche studios, which are represented by the NICHE variable.
For Ebert & Roeper and Entertainment Weekly, this result was statistically
significant. As noted above, this result was not unexpected, because all
three media outlets have wide intended audiences and thus may be less
likely to review niche films than would other media outlets.
The estimated coefficients of the other explanatory variables
indicate that there is not bias in the selection of movies to review,
confirming the conclusions from Tables 2 and 3. As the estimated
coefficients of the AFFILIATE variable show, all else equal, none of the
media outlets are significantly more likely to review affiliated movies than
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unaffiliated movies.162 In fact, all else equal, Ebert & Roeper is actually
less likely to review Disney movies than other movies.
In addition, as the estimated coefficients of the QUALITY variable
demonstrate that, all else equal, all the media outlets are more likely to
review higher quality movies than lesser quality movies.163 For Ebert &
Roeper and Entertainment Weekly this result is statistically significant.
However, as the estimated coefficient of the AFFILIATE x QUALITY
interaction variable shows, none of the media outlets are significantly
more likely to review higher quality affiliated movies than unaffiliated
movies.164
The results for the New York Post require some additional
explanation. Because the New York Post reviewed all 56 movies
distributed by News Corporation, there is quasi-complete separation of the
data165 and thus the coefficient of the AFFILIATE variable cannot be
estimated. However, it can be determined that the coefficient is positive
162

Note that, because of the presence of the AFFILIATE x QUALITY interaction
term in the regressions, the proper interpretation of the coefficient of AFFILIATE is
the effect of affiliation on the dependent variable when QUALITY=0 (i.e., when a
movie receives the same number of positive and negative reviews from unaffiliated
reviewers).

163

Because of the presence of the AFFILIATE x QUALITY interaction term in the
regressions, the proper interpretation of the coefficient of QUALITY is the effect of
movie quality on the dependent variable when AFFILIATE=0 (i.e., when the movie is
reviewed by an unaffiliated reviewer).

164

It is possible that a film’s genre (comedy, action, etc) may affect the probability
that a movie is reviewed. For example, if Entertainment Weekly’s enjoy action
movies more than do readers of other publications, then Entertainment Weekly might
be more likely to review an action movie than are other reviewers. To control for this
factor, the regressions were rerun including, as explanatory variables, dummy
variables for the movies’ genres, as listed in the in the Internet Movie Database.
However, controlling for genre did not markedly change any of the results. The full
logistic results when genre variables are included are available from the author.

165

Quasi-complete separation occurs when some linear function of the explanatory
variables can perfectly predict one possible outcome of the dependent variable. In
this particular regression, one outcome of the dependent variable – a particular movie
is not reviewed by the New York Post – can be fully explained by the AFFILIATE
variable; all of the movies that are not reviewed by the New York Post were also not
distributed by a News Corporation subsidiary. See Paul Allison, Convergence
Problems in Logistic Regression, NUMERICAL ISSUES IN STATISTICAL COMPUTING
FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST 238, 240-51 (Micah Altman et al. eds., 2004) (discussion
of quasi-complete separation in logistic regressions and of methods for handling the
problem).
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(i.e., greater than zero) and statistically insignificant.166 In addition,
because of the quasi-complete separation, all the other estimated
coefficients for that regression should be interpreted as the estimated
coefficients for movies that are not distributed by News Corporation.167
Because of this interpretation, and because for the New York Post
regression the AFFILIATE x QUALITY interaction variable has a value
of zero for all movies not distributed by a News Corporation subsidiary,168
the AFFILIATE x QUALITY variable is not included in the New York
Post regression.
In summary, the empirical results presented in this section indicate
that movie critics are not biased in selecting which movies to review. All
else equal, they are no more likely to review affiliated movies than
unaffiliated movies in general, nor are they more likely to review higher
quality affiliated movies than unaffiliated movies.
2. Bias in the Review Itself
The second question this article examines is whether critics exhibit
a bias in favor of affiliated movies in the grades they give to the movies.
To help answer this question, Table 6 presents the percentage of reviews
given by each media outlet that are favorable169 – broken down by the
parent company of the studio distributing the movie. To make a fair
comparison, only those movies that were reviewed by all three outlets are
included.
Based on Table 6, critics do not appear to favor affiliated movies
over unaffiliated movies. For example, Ebert & Roeper is no more likely
to give favorable reviews to Disney movies than are Entertainment Weekly
and the New York Post. Similarly, Entertainment Weekly does not give
better reviews to Time Warner movies than do the other media outlets, and
166

Id. at 249.

167

Id. at 249.

168

Recall that AFFILIATE has a value of zero for all movies not distributed by a
subsidiary of the critic’s parent company. Thus AFFILIATE x QUALITY – the
AFFILIATE variable multiplied by the QUALITY variable -- will also have a value
of zero for such movies.
169

Each media outlet uses a different rating system. Ebert & Roeper gives a
“Thumbs Up” (favorable review) or a “Thumbs Down” (unfavorable review).
Entertainment Weekly gives a letter grade ranging from A to F; reviews giving at least
a B- are generally favorable. The New York Post gives a grade ranging from 4 stars to
0 stars; reviews giving at least 2.5 stars are generally favorable.

40

VOL

:

the New York Post does not give better reviews to News Corporation
movies than do the other media outlets. Indeed, there is no statistically
significant difference between the percentage of reviews, given by the
three media outlets to a particular distributor’s movies, that are
favorable170

TABLE 6
Percentage of Reviews that are Positive
News
Corp.
(48 movies)

Parent

Disney
(92 movies)

Time
Warner
(102 movies)

Ebert & Roeper

Disney

64.7%

48.0%

59.4%

Entertainment
Weekly

Time
Warner

59.8%

47.1%

45.8%

New York Post

News
Corp.

71.7%

48.0%

54.2%

Chi-squared = 4.76, Degrees of freedom=10 (Not Statistically Significant)

Although Table 6 suggests that no bias exists in the grades critics
give to movies, further analysis is necessary to control for other factors
that may be obscuring bias. For example, Ebert & Roeper, Entertainment
Weekly, and the New York Post each have multiple movie critics. Thus, a
logistic regression analysis is again used in which a number of
quantifiable, explanatory variables are examined that may affect the
probability that a movie receives a particular grade from a particular critic.

170

The null hypothesis tested is that the percentage of reviews of a particular studio’s
movies that are favorable is independent of the media outlet. As noted in Table 6, this
null hypothesis cannot be rejected because the chi square statistic is only 4.76, with
10 degrees of freedom.
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Quality of Movie
Recall that the variable QUALITY is the average grade given to a
movie by reviewers with no affiliation to the studio that distributed it.
Although critics often disagree about a movie’s merit, it is likely that, in
general, the grade a particular critic gives a particular movie will be
positively correlated with the grades that other critics give the movie.
Thus, all else equal, the variable QUALITY should be positively
correlated with the grade that a particular reviewer gives a movie.
Affiliated Movie
As noted above, AFFILIATE is a binary dummy variable that
denotes whether the film is distributed by a studio affiliated with the media
outlet in which the review appears. It has a value of 1 if it is an affiliated
movie, and a value of 0 otherwise. If critics are more likely to give
favorable reviews to films of affiliated studios then, all else equal,
AFFILIATE should be positively correlated with the grade that a critic
gives a particular movie.
To test whether these variables help explain the grades critics give
movies, the dependent variable GRADE – the grade a critic gives a
particular movie – is regressed against these two independent variables
and an intercept term. This regression is conducted for each of the
primary critics: Roger Ebert and Richard Roeper of Ebert & Roeper;
Owen Gleiberman and Lisa Schwarzbaum of Entertainment Weekly, and
Jonathan Foreman and Lou Lumenick of the New York Post.
Different critics use different grading systems. Critics for
Entertainment Weekly give movies letter grades ranging from A to F;
critics for the New York Post give grades ranging from four stars to zero
stars, in half-star increments. Thus, because the dependent variable
GRADE is an ordered, categorical variable an ordered logistic regression
is used for the Entertainment Weekly and the New York Post reviewers.171
On the Ebert & Roeper television show, reviewers Roger Ebert and
Richard Roeper give movies either a “Thumbs Up” (a positive review) or a
“Thumbs Down” (a negative review). Thus, because the dependent
variable GRADE has only two possible values for them, 1 (for a positive
review) or 0 (for a negative review), a simple logistic regression is used
171

The dependent variable, GRADE, is categorical because only certain values are
possible (A, A-, etc. for Entertainment Weekly and 4 stars, 3.5 stars, etc. for the New
York Post) and it is ordered because these categories are ordered (e.g., an A is a
higher grade than an A-, which is higher than a B+, etc.).
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for the Ebert and for Roeper. The regression results are presented in Table
7.

TABLE 7
Determinants of Review Grade
(Logit Estimates; Intercepts not Displayed)
Critic

QUALITY AFFILIATE

Pseudo
R2

EBERT & ROEPER
Roger Ebert
(612 movies)

Richard Roeper
(567 movies)

3.4571 ***
(<.0001)

0.0268
(.9269)

.3245

1.9619 ***
(<.0001)

0.5528 **
(.0400)

.1502

2.4320 ***
(<.0001)

-0.2757
(.2885)

.0922

3.4371 ***
(<.0001)

-0.0718
(.7791)

.1513

2.9108 ***
(<.0001)

0.2010
(.6199)

.1478

2.6960 ***
(<.0001)

0.7199 **
(.0315)

.1261

ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY
Owen Gleiberman
(364 movies)

Lisa Schwarzbaum
(355 movies)

NEW YORK POST
Jonathan Foreman
(367 movies)

Lou Lumenick
(494 movies)

*
Statistically significant at the 10 percent level
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level

Table 7 supports the conclusion that, in general, critics are not
biased in the grades they give movies. Only four of the six critics
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examined gave more favorable reviews to affiliated movies, and for only
two of these critics, Richard Roeper and Lou Lumineck, was the result
statistically significant.172 Taken as a whole, the six critics are not
statistically significantly more likely to give a favorable review to an
affiliated movie than to an unaffiliated movie.173 Unlike research analysts,
critics do not exhibit a systematic bias in favor of affiliated movies.174
IV. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS
This article’s empirical analyses show that movie critics are not
systematically biased in favor of affiliated movies, either in their selection
of which movies to review or in the grades they give the movies. Thus,
movie critics working for the world’s largest media conglomerates appear
to be passing on the opportunity to increase the profits of their
conglomerates. This is particularly interesting given the efforts, discussed
above, of media conglomerates to use their subsidiaries to promote each
other’s products.
172

The regression results imply that there is a 48.1% probability that Roeper will give
a favorable review to an unaffiliated movie that has received an equal number of
favorable and unfavorable reviews from other critics, but a 61.7% probability that he
will give a favorable review to a similar quality affiliated movie. Also, the results
imply that there is a 46.6% probability that Lumenick will give a favorable review to
an unaffiliated movie that has received an equal number of favorable and unfavorable
reviews from other critics, but a 64.2% probability that he will give a favorable
review to a similar quality affiliated movie. However, as a whole, critics are not
statistically significantly more likely to give a favorable review to an affiliated movie.

173

The regression results obtained from using all six critics are available from the
author.
174

It is possible that a film’s genre (comedy, action, etc) may affect the grade that a
particular critic gives a movie. Critics may differ in the genres they prefer, and these
preferences may be reflected in the grades they give to a particular studio’s movies.
Thus, a critic might give higher ratings to affiliated movies because the affiliated
studio makes more movies of genres that that critic prefers rather than because that
critic is biased towards affiliated movies. For example, if Roger Ebert likes romantic
comedies more than other critics do, and if a greater percentage of Disney’s movies
are romantic comedies than are other studios’ films, then, all else equal, he will give
better reviews to Disney films, even if he is not biased in favor of Disney. To control
for this factor, the regressions were rerun including dummy variables for the movies’
genres, as listed in the in the Internet Movie Database. However, controlling for
genre did not markedly change any of the results. The full logistic results when the
genre variables are included are available from the author.
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In addition, this finding also stands in stark contrast to the
systematic bias of research analysts in favor of current and potential
investment banking clients. It also raises an important question: why do
some conflicts of interest (like those facing research analysts in large
financial conglomerates) result in biased opinions and harm to consumers,
while others (like those facing movie critics in large media conglomerates)
do not? Determining what factors account for this difference can provide
insight what causes conflict of interests to actually cause bias and how
regulators can reduce research analysts’ bias.
One possible explanation for movie critics’ lack of bias may be
that high-profile critics wish to protect their reputations for being
unbiased; all of the critics examined in this paper work for large media
outlets. Research in many fields has demonstrated that the desire to
protect a one’s reputation can cause a person to engage in behavior that is
against that person’s short-term interest.175
There is evidence thatmovie critics of the stature examined in this
article are aware of their reputations for being unbiased. For example,
Roger Ebert and Richard Roeper annually host a film festival on a Disney
cruise and their attendance is highlighted in Walt Disney Cruise Line’s
advertising of the cruise.176 When Ebert was asked by a reporter if he
worried his attendance would create the appearance of a conflict of interest
when he reviewed Disney movies, Ebert replied that he was not worried
about such a perception because in his decades of reviewing movies he
had developed a reputation for being unbiased.177 He noted, as an
example, that he had given very negative reviews to two recent major
Disney movies: Pearl Harbor and The Princess Diaries.178 In addition,
175

See, e.g., Daniel M. Covitz & Paul Harrison, Testing Conflicts of Interest at Bond
Ratings Agencies with Market Anticipation: Evidence that Reputation Incentives
Dominate, Federal Reserve Board Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-68
1 (2003), available at http:// www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200368/
200368pap.pdf (“rating changes do not appear to be importantly influenced by rating
agency conflicts of interest, but, rather, suggest that rating agencies are motivated
primarily by reputation-related incentives.”)
176

Munoz, supra note 30, at F10.

177

Id. Ebert also stated that before agreeing to host the festival, he and Roeper
insisted that there be no pressure put on them to show Disney films at the festival. In
addition, to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest, both he and Roeper are not
paid to host the film festival. Jessica Shaw, All Thumbs on Deck, ENTERTAINMENT
WKLY., Mar. 14, 2003, at 40, available at 2003 WL 6557235.
178

Id.
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he argued that the importance of maintaining his reputation would prevent
him from being biased: “I have much more to lose than Disney has to
gain. . . . If anybody perceives that I’m not telling the truth as I see it, I’m
out of business.”179
Other critics for major publications echo similar professionalism
standards. For example, Owen Gleiberman, a critic for Entertainment
Weekly – and one of the critics examined in this paper – has complained
that “[t]oo many puff critics, quote whores . . . and bland, lily-livered
critics are drowning out the serious critics.”180
However, reputation concerns are likely not largely responsible for
the lack of bias found in this Article. First, bias would be very difficult for
moviegoers to detect for a number of reasons. As noted above, it is very
unlikely that moviegoers know whether a particular movie’s distributor
and the critic’s media outlet have the same parent company. In addition,
because each studio distributes only a fraction of the movies released, the
vast majority of a critic’s reviews would be unaffected by bias.181 For
these reasons, it is very unlikely that a bias toward affiliated movies would
be detected, absent the types of empirical analyses used in this Article.
The bias would affect only a small percentage of the critic’s reviews and
because the public is unaware of which movies are affiliated with a
particular critic, the public would not be aware that it was bias in favor of
affiliated movies.
In addition, reputation concerns by critics would be unable to
prevent unintentional bias. At most law schools, professors grade exams
blind – i.e., without knowing who wrote the exam – in part to avoid
unintentional bias in grading.182 Similarly, a critic may subconsciously
look more favorably on a movie because it is distributed by an affiliated
studio.
Finally, the fact that similar reputation concerns did not prevent
bias in research analysts, also suggests that reputation concerns would not
be sufficient to prevent bias in movie critics. Research analysts’ bias
occurred despite the fact that analysts’ reputations for providing accurate
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Id.
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Shaw, supra note 31, at A1.
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For example, Time Warner studios distributed only 11.4% of the movies examined
in this paper, the most of any parent company.
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Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race From Legal Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 51, 69 (1994).
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forecasts can be important to their success.183 In addition, the accuracy of
analysts’ forecasts can be objectively measured, unlike the accuracy of
movie reviews. If a research analyst recommends a particular stock or
issues an estimate of a company’s quarterly earnings, then it will be clear
in hindsight whether the analyst was correct, and his or her reputation
could be affected accordingly. In contrast, a critic’s judgment regarding
the quality of a particular movie is inherently subjective, so although a
critic might be hold a minority view regarding certain movies, one cannot
objectively conclude that the critic was inaccurate.
The primary explanations for the differences in bias exhibited by
movie critics and research analysts are differences in the structures of the
organizations in which they work, and differences in the financial
incentives that they face. These differences also suggest that many of the
recent reforms targeted at research analysts are likely to be successful in
reducing analysts’ bias.
As discussed above, these reforms fall into three categories: (1)
reforms designed to make research analysts independent, especially from
their firms’ investment bankers; (2) reforms designed to eliminate research
analysts’ financial interest in the effect of their reports on the companies
they cover; and (3) reforms that require disclosure of research analysts’
conflicts of interest. This article’s empirical analyses suggest that the first
two sets of reforms are likely to be successful, but the disclosure
requirements are unnecessary.
Increasing Research Analysts’ Independence
The first type of reform is directed at increasing research analysts’
independence, especially from their firms’ investment bankers. As
discussed above, research analysts gave more favorable coverage to
companies with which their employer had or hoped to secure investment
banking business. This is unsurprising in light of the pressure on these
research analysts to write positive reports about such companies. For
example, companies threatened to end lucrative investment banking
relationships with the employers of research analysts who wrote
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Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik, Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and
Biased Earnings Forecasts, 58 J. FIN. 313 (2003) (empirical study finding that
forecasting accuracy affects research analysts’ career success). Hong and Kubik’s
study also found that for stocks underwritten by analysts’ employers, forecasting
accuracy has less impact -- and optimism in the forecasts has a greater impact -- on
career advancement. This demonstrates that the conflicts of interest can outweigh an
analyst’s concern for having a reputation of being an accurate forecaster. Id.
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unfavorable reports about them.184 Sometimes these threats resulted in
research analysts being removed from covering the complaining
company.185
There were also other sources of pressure to produce biased
recommendations. Research analysts often worked under the supervision
of the investment banking department.186 In addition, some research
analysts’ compensation was directly based in part on the investment
banking business that they helped bring in.187 In fact, investment banking
departments’ pitches for business from a company sometimes included a
promise that a particularly well known research analyst at the investment
bank’s firm would cover the company’s stock.188 Sometimes the research
analyst would even attend these pitches.189
The situation is very different for movie critics working for media
conglomerates. There is no evidence that these critics or their parent
companies view part of the critics’ jobs as the promotion of affiliated
movies. Also, critics’ supervisors are editors of the media outlet for which
they work, not executives of affiliated studios.190 In addition, critics’
compensation is not based on how affiliated movies perform at the box
office.191 For all these reasons, critics do not face the great pressure to
184

See, e.g., Jeremy Kahn, Frank Quattrone’s Heavy Hand, FORTUNE, Dec. 30, 2002,
at 78, available at 2002 WL 101716118 (the Chief Executive Officer of EarthLink
threatened to move Earthlink’s investment banking business from Credit Suisse First
Boston (CSFB) because of CSFB’s research reports on Earthlink).
185

Id.
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See, e.g., Landon Thomas Jr., U.S. Accuses a Top Banker of Obstruction, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library (while he was global
head of technology banking for Credit Suisse First Boston, Frank Quattrone also had
“direct control over his research analysts”).
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Smith, supra note 57; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 3.
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See also Marion Webb, New Rules enacted for Wall Street brokerage firms:
analysts’ conduct raises regulators’ eyebrows, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at
15, available at 2002 WL 13652566 (quoting an Ernst & Young partner as saying that
“[c]ompanies pick the investment bankers based upon their comfort with the research
analyst, and expectation that the research analyst will provide favorable coverage –
but there isn’t a formal guarantee for it”).
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Smith, supra note 57.
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Telephone Interview with Dann Gire, supra note 49.
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give favorable reviews to affiliated movies that research analysts felt to
give favorable coverage to actual or potential investment banking clients.
This contrast between research analysts and movie critics also
indicates the importance of an individual having a personal stake in the
creation of bias for a conflict of interest to result in actual bias. This
Article’s findings indicate that, to create bias, it is not enough that that
individual’s parent company benefits from bias; instead the bias must also
benefit the individual research analyst or critic personally. Research
analysts who gave negative coverage to investment banking clients risk
reducing their own compensation. However, movie critics who give
unfavorable reviews to affiliated movies face no such sanctions. The
result of these differing incentives appears to be that stock
recommendations are often biased but movie reviews are not. This
strongly suggests that reforms that increase research analysts’
independence from investment bankers should reduce bias in research
analysts’ reports.
Eliminating Research Analysts’ Stake in How Their Reports
Affect the Companies They Cover
Another way that research analysts can have a personal financial
stake is by actually owning a financial interest in the companies they
cover. Obviously, a research analyst with a financial stake in a company
the analyst covers will have a conflict of interest. For example, if the
analyst owns stock in a company, the analyst will have a direct personal
financial incentive to not issue a negative report on the company because
the report may adversely affect the value of the analyst’s stockholding.192
Thus, the second type of reform is directed at eliminating research
analysts’ personal financial interest in how their coverage affects the
companies they cover. As discussed above, these reforms consist of rules
limiting the types and timing of transactions that analysts can make in the
securities of the companies they cover.
The article’s finding of little evidence of bias by movie critics
suggests that these reforms are also warranted. Unlike some research
analysts, movie critics do not have direct financial interests in the movies
they review. Some critics are involved in the production of particular
movies, but these critics do not review movies with which they were
involved.193 For example, the Ethics Policy of the Chicago Film Critics
192

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 3.
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Telephone Interview with Dann Gire, supra note 49.
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Association explicitly prohibits critics from “participating (regardless of
compensation) in productions that will be reviewed by the critic.”194
The importance of having a personal financial stake in the creation
of bias is further illustrated by the effect of press junkets on some movie
critics. As discussed above, studios give many critics who attend these
junkets free airfare, expensive hotel rooms and meals, spending money,
and access to movie stars. In addition, studios have sometimes
temporarily blackballed critics who were harshly critical of the studios’
movies.195 As discussed above, there is at least strong anecdotal evidence
that some regular junket attendees respond to these incentives by making
very positive statements about the movies shown at the junkets.196
Regular junket attendees often provide the positive blurbs that appear in
advertising about movies that received widespread poor reviews.197
The behavior of some junket attendees provides more support for
the conclusion that preventing critics from having a personal financial
interest in the creation of bias is a key to preventing bias. Similarly, it
indicates that eliminating research analysts’ personal financial stake in
how their reports affect the companies they cover is a key to eliminating
bias in their reports.
Disclosure Requirements
This final type of recent reform requires the public disclosure of
the conflicts of interests that research analysts face.
Disclosure
requirements may serve two purposes. First, disclosure may make it less
likely that investors will rely upon biased reports. Disclosure alerts
investors to a research analyst’s conflict of interests so that they may view
the analyst’s report with more skepticism.198 Second, because investors
will be aware of the conflicts, disclosure may encourage research analysts
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EthicsPolicy of the Chicago Film Critics Association (on file with the author).
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See supra p. 11.

196

Roger Ebert, supra note 49, at 35 (“How do you qualify as a quote whore? You
give good quote. Freebie junketeers sometimes scribble down words of praise and
pass them to publicists right at the junket.”)
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Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein, Don A. Moore. The Dirt on Coming
Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 6, on file with author).
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to not be biased, because their recommendations and forecasts will be
viewed more suspiciously.199
However, this article’s results indicate that the disclosure
requirements are unnecessary. As noted above, movie critics do not
disclose when they are reviewing a movie distributed by a studio with
which they are affiliated. Despite this lack of disclosure, movie critics do
not show systematic bias toward affiliated movies. Because critics work
independently from those who distribute the affiliated movies, and because
critics lack a personal financial interest in the success of affiliated movies,
they do not exhibit the bias displayed by research analysts. Thus no
disclosure of movie critics’ conflicts of interests appears necessary.
This also suggests that requiring research analysts to disclose their
conflicts of interest would be unnecessary if the other reforms are
successful in keeping analysts independent from their firms’ investment
bankers and in keeping analysts from having a personal stake in how their
coverage affects the companies they cover.
This conclusion is especially important because other research has
shown that disclosure may have unintended, undesirable effects.200 One
such effect is that, if forced to disclose their conflicts of interest, research
analysts may react strategically by making forecasts and recommendations
exhibiting even greater bias.201 For example, if an analyst believes that
disclosure of the firm’s investment banking relationship will cause
investors to discount the analysts’ recommendation to purchase a
particular stock, the analyst might intentionally give an even more
exaggerated recommendation to offset this discounting. In other words,
“[w]hile disclosure might warn an audience to cover its ears, it may also
encourage advisors to yell even louder.”202
In addition, disclosure might increase bias by making some
research analysts feel that disclosure gives them an ethical green light to
give biased advice.203 An analyst may believe that because disclosure
199

Id. (manuscript at 7).
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These potential undesirable effects, and the psychological studies underpinning
them, are thoroughly discussed in Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein, Don A.
Moore, Coming Clean but Playing Dirty: The Shortcomings of Disclosure as a
Solution to Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (Don A. Moore et al. eds.,
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warns investors to beware of bias, the analyst is relieved of the ethical
responsibility of being unbiased. The results of some psychology
experiments indicate that this concern is justified.204
A related problem of disclosure is that it may reduce the likelihood
that policy-makers take other steps to actually reduce or eliminate the
existence of the conflict of interest. Because disclosure warns consumers
of advice to be wary of the advice, disclosure may be perceived as
reducing policy-makers’ responsibility for any harm resulting from the
conflict, and thus may lessen the political pressure on policymakers to
reduce or eliminate the conflict of interest.205
In addition, investors may not react to the disclosure in the way
that the SEC intends them to. For example, if analysts disclose their
conflicts of interest, the act of disclosure might be perceived as evidence
that the analysts are being honest, and thus might lead to even greater
reliance on the conflicted analysts’ forecasts and recommendations.206
Also, even if investors do react to disclosure by being more
skeptical of conflicted analyst’s advice, for several reasons investors are
very unlikely to discount sufficiently that conflicted advice. First, there is
no reason to believe that investors are aware of the amount by which
conflicted research analysts’ forecasts should be discounted. In fact,
psychological research indicates that people are likely to underestimate the
bias resulting from conflicts of interest.207 Second, other psychological
204

Benoit Monin & Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of
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Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Corresondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL.
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experiments have long demonstrated that because of an “anchoring and
insufficient adjustment effect,” people will give too much weight to
advice, even if it is disclosed to them that the advice is randomly
generated.208 In addition, other experiments have demonstrated the
“failure of evidentiary discreditation”: people have difficulty disregarding
information (such as stock forecasts that they have seen), even if they
learn that the information is inaccurate.209
The combination of disclosure requirements causing analysts’
research reports possibly to be even more biased, and investors being
unable to sufficiently discount the research reports for this bias, means that
investors might even be made worse off by disclosure requirements.
Indeed, a recent experiment found that when forced to disclose their
conflict of interest, conflicted advisors’ advice was much more biased than
when they did not have to disclose their conflict.210 Although the
receivers of the advice discounted the advice in response to the disclosure,
they did so insufficiently.211 As a result, overall, the receivers of the
advice were worse off than if disclosure of the conflict had not been
given.212
These possible adverse effects of disclosure support the conclusion
that the reforms directed at research analysts should focus on reducing
their conflicts of interest rather than on mandating the disclosure of the
conflicts.213
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Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124-1131 (1974).
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Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental
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V. CONCLUSION
Conglomerates have the opportunity to exploit synergies between
their businesses to offer better products or services or lower prices.
However, they also can create conflicts of interests for their employees.
This article has examined two industries in which certain professionals
face similar conflicts of interests because of the conglomerates in which
they work.
Millions of investors rely on the sincere investment advice
research analysts who work in brokerages. However, those research
analysts whose employer is part of financial institutions with that also
have investment banking divisions face a conflict of interest because
giving positive recommendations regarding particular stocks can help the
financial institution secure lucrative investment banking business.
Similarly, millions of consumers rely on movie critics for sincere
advice regarding which movies to see. However, those movie critics
whose employers are part of media conglomerates that also own movie
studios have a conflict of interest because giving positive reviews of those
studios’ movies can cause more people to see the movies.
Despite the similarities in the conflicts of interest facing these two
sets of professions, they have responded very differently to the conflicts.
Previous research and litigation has demonstrated that research analysts’
reports have been biased by their conflict of interest. However, this
Article’s empirical analyses have found no systematic bias in movie
critics’ reviews.
The difference can be attributed to the fact that the organizational
structure and financial incentives facing movie critics differ significantly
from those that faced many research analysts. These critics are not
supervised by studio executives, nor do critics personally profit from how
much money their reviews make for affiliated studios. On the other hand,
many research analysts were being supervised by their firms’ investment
bankers, compensated partly upon how much investment banking business
they helped bring in, and were able to personally financially benefit from
how their reports affected the prices of the securities they covered.
The Article’s findings provide guidance for policymakers tasked
with controlling conflicts of interest. Their focus should be on reducing
the existence of the conflicts of interests, not on publicly disclosing them.
This conclusion is especially important given recent research showing that,
at least in some contexts, disclosure can harm those it is intended to
protect.
This conclusion also speaks favorably of many of the rules and
regulations the Securities Exchange Commission and others have recently
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imposed on research analysts and their employers. Because many of the
recent reforms will make the organizational structure and financial
incentives of research analysts’ more like those of movie critics, this
article provides support for the conclusion that such reforms will likely
reduce analysts’ bias. However, it also suggests that the reforms that
mandate public disclosure of the analysts’ conflicts of interests are
unnecessary. Movie reviews do not disclose when the critic is reviewing
an affiliated movie, yet these reviews are still not biased.
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